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Abstract. We consider the problem of defining the information leakage in in-
teractive systems where secrets and observables can alternate during the com-
putation. We show that the information-theoretic approach which interprets such
systems as (simple) noisy channels is no longer valid. However, the principle can
be recovered if we consider channels of a more complicated kind, that in Infor-
mation Theory are known as channels with memory and feedback. We show that
there is a complete correspondence between interactive systems and such kind
of channels. Furthermore, we show that the capacity of the channels associated
to such systems is a continuous function of a pseudometric based on the Kan-
torovich metric.
1 Introduction
Information leakage refers to the problem that arises when the observable behavior of
a system reveals information that we would like to keep secret. This is also known as
the problem of information flow from high variables to low variables. In recent years
there has been a growing interest in quantitative approaches to this problem, because it
is often desirable to quantify the partial knowledge of the secrets in terms of probability
a distribution. Another reason is that the mechanisms to protect the information may
use randomization to obfuscate the relation between the secrets and the observables.
Among the quantitative approaches, some of the most popular ones are based on In-
formation Theory [5, 16, 4, 24, 6]. The idea is to interpret the system as an information-
theoretic channel, where the secrets are the input and the observables are the output. The
channel matrix consists of the conditional probabilities p(b | a), defined as the measure
of the executions producing the observable b, relatively to those which contain the secret
a. The leakage is represented by the mutual information, and the worst-case leakage by
the capacity of the channel.
In the above works, the secret value is assumed to be chosen at the beginning of
the computation. We are interested in the more general scenario in which secrets can
be chosen at any point. More precisely, we consider interactive systems, i.e. systems
in which secrets and observables can alternate during the computation and influence
each other. Examples of interactive systems include auction protocols like [31, 27, 25].
Some of these have become very popular thanks to their integration in Internet-based
electronic commerce platforms [10, 11, 19]. Other examples of interactive programs
include web servers, GUI applications, and command-line programs [3].
In this paper we investigate the applicability of the information-theoretic approach
to interactive systems. In order to derive an information-theoretic channel, at a first look
it would seem natural to define the matrix elements by using the definition of p(b | a) in
terms of the joint and marginal probabilities p(a, b) and p(b). Namely, the entry p(b | a)
would be defined as the measure of the traces with (secret, observable)-projection (a, b),
divided by the measure of the traces with secret projection a. An approach of this kind
was proposed in [9]. However, in the interactive case this construction does not really
produce an information-theoretic channel. In fact, by definition a channel should be
invariant with respect to the input distribution, and this is not the case here, as shown
by the following example.
Example 1. Figure 1 represents a web-based interaction between one seller and two
possible buyers, rich and poor. The seller offers two different products, cheap and ex-
pensive, with given probabilities. Once the product is offered, each buyer may try to
buy it, with a certain probability. For simplicity we assume that the buyers offers are
exclusive. We assume that the offers are observables, in the sense that they are made
public on the website, while the identity of the buyer that actually buys the product
should be kept secret from an external observer. The symbols r, q1, q2, r, q1, q2 repre-
sent probabilities, with the convention that r = 1− r (and the same for the pairs q1, q1
and q2, q2).
cheap expensive
poor rich
poor rich
r r
q1 q1 q2 q2
Fig. 1. An interactive syst.
Following [9] we can compute the conditional proba-
bilities as p(b|a) = p(a,b)p(a) , thus obtaining the matrix in Ta-
ble 1. However, the matrix is not invariant with respect to
the input distribution. For instance, let us assume r = r =
1
2 , q1 =
2
3 , and q2 =
2
3ρ, where ρ is a parameter. Therefore
we have p(poor) = rq1 + rq2 = 13 (1 +ρ) or, equivalently,
ρ = 3 · p(poor)− 1. Two different input distributions will
determine different values of ρ, and therefore q2. Hence
also the channel matrices will be different, as the two ex-
amples in Table 2 show.
cheap expensive
poor rq1rq1+rq2
rq2
rq1+rq2
rich rq1rq1+rq2
rq2
rq1+rq2
Table 1. Channel matrix
for Example 1
Consequently, when the secrets occur after the observ-
ables we cannot consider the conditional probabilities as
representing a (classical) channel, and we cannot apply the
standard information-theoretic concepts. In particular, we
cannot adopt the (classical) capacity to represent the worst-
case leakage, since the capacity is defined as the maximum
information leakage using a fixed channel matrix over all
possible input distributions. In other words, if we com-
puted the (standard notion of) capacity using the matrix
C obtained with a given input distribution D we could get a wrong result, because the
capacity would in general correspond to the value of mutual information on a distribu-
tion D′ 6= D. But since the matrix depends on the input distribution, D′ would give a
new matrix C ′ 6= C.
The first contribution of this paper is to consider an extension of the theory of chan-
nels which makes the information-theoretic approach applicable also the case of in-
teractive systems. It turns out that a richer notion of channels, known in Information
Theory as channels with memory and feedback, serves our purposes. The dependence
of inputs on previous outputs corresponds to feedback, and the dependence of outputs
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(a) r = 1
2
, q1 =
2
3
, ρ = 1
2
, q2 =
1
3
cheap expensive Input distr.
poor 2
3
1
3
p(poor) = 1
2
rich 1
3
2
3
p(rich) = 1
2
(b) r = 1
2
, q1 =
2
3
, ρ = 1
4
, q2 =
1
6
cheap expensive Input distr.
poor 4
5
1
5
p(poor) = 5
12
rich 2
7
5
7
p(rich) = 7
12
Table 2. Two different channel matrices induced by two different input distributions
on previous inputs and outputs corresponds to memory. Recent results in Information
Theory [29] have shown that, in such channels, the transmission rate does not corre-
spond to the maximum mutual information (the standard notion of capacity), but rather
to the maximum normalized directed information, a concept introduced by Massey [17].
We propose to adopt this latter notion to represent leakage.
Our model of attacker is the interactive version of the attacker associated to Shannon
entropy in the classification of Ko¨pf and Basin [15]. We recall that in [15] an attacker is
defined by the kind of questions that he can pose to an hypothetical oracle. In the case
of Shannon entropy the questions are of the form “does s belong to S?” where s is the
secret that the attacker is trying to figure out, and S is a subset of the domain of secret
values. The degree of invulnerability of the secret is the average number of questions
that the attacker needs to ask in order to find out the exact value of the secret, under the
best strategy (i.e. the best choice of the S’s) for the given probability distribution on the
secret values. It is easy to see that the invulnerability degree corresponds to the Shannon
entropy of the secret. In the case of a standard single-use channel, the invulnerability
degree of the secret before the attacker observes the output is the entropy of the input,
determined by its a priori distribution. The invulnerability degree after the attacker ob-
serves the output is the conditional entropy of the input given the output, determined
by its a posteriori distribution. The latter in general is lower than the first. The differ-
ence between these invulnerability degrees corresponds to the mutual information, and
represents the leakage of the system.
In our interactive framework we consider the same scenario, but iterated. At each
time step, we consider the input sequence so far; and the increase of its vulnerability
caused by the observation of the new output is the contribution of the present step to the
leakage. The sum of all these contributions represents the total leakage and, as we will
see, corresponds to Massey’s directed information. We will come back to the model of
attacker in Section 5, and discuss also a variant of this interpretation.
Gray investigated a concept similar to directed information, and he also conjectured
the correspondence with the channel’s transmission rate [13]. His model is based on
Millen’s synchronous state machines [20] and it is more general than ours, in that it
admits observables and secrets at both ends of the channel. In other words, in addition
to high inputs and low outputs, it considers also high inputs and low outputs. Gray
derived his “quasi-directed-information” notion by extending Gallager’s formula for
discrete finite state channels [12], and proposed it as definition of leakage, adducing as
justification the above conjecture. However it is easy to see that the conjecture does not
hold. We come back to this point in Section 5, after Definition 9.
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A second contribution of our work is the proof that the channel capacity is a continu-
ous function of a pseudometric on interactive systems based on the Kantorovich metric.
The reason why we are interested in the continuity of the capacity is for computability
purposes. Given a function f from a (pseudo)metric space X to a (pseudo)metric space
Y the property of continuity for f means that, given a series of objects x1, x2, . . . ∈ X
converging to x ∈ X , the series f(x1), f(x2), . . . ∈ Y converges to f(x) ∈ X . Hence
f(x) can be approximated by the objects f(x1), f(x2), . . .. The typical use of this prop-
erty is in the case the trees are generated by programs containing loops. Generally the
automaton expressing the semantics of the program can be seen as the (metric) limit of
the sequence of trees generated by unfolding the loop at an increasingly deeper level.
The continuity of the capacity means that we can approximate the real capacity by the
capacities of these trees.
The continuity of the channel capacity was also proved in [9] for simple channels,
but the proof does not adapt to the case of channels with memory and feedback and we
had to devise a different technique. We illustrate this point by showing a counterexample
(cfr. Example 6).
1.1 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some important concepts from
Probabilistic Automata and Information Theory. Section 3 reviews the notion of chan-
nel with memory and feedback that is the core of the model we propose. We discuss the
concept of directed information and also the concept of capacity in the presence of feed-
back. Section 4 contains our main contribution. We explain how Interactive Information
Hiding Systems (IIHSs) can be modeled using channels with memory and feedback. In
particular we show that for any IIHS there is always a channel that simulates its prob-
abilistic behavior. In Section 5 we discuss our notion of adversary and we define the
quantification of information leakage as the channel’s directed information from input
to output, or as the directed capacity, depending on whether the input distribution is
fixed or not. In Section 6 we show an example of our model applied to a protocol: the
Cocaine Auction protocol. Section 7 proposes a pseudometric structure on IIHSs based
on the Kantorovich metric. We also show that the capacity of the channels associated to
interactive systems is a continuous function with respect to this pseudometric. In Sec-
tions 8 and 9 we review and discuss the main results of the paper and illustrate some
future work.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of CONCUR 2010
[1]. The additional material presented here consists in the proofs, the auxiliary Lem-
mata 2, 3, and 4, Propositions 2 and 3, more examples, and a more elaborate discussion
about the model.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly review some basic notions that we will need throughout the
paper.
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2.1 Probabilistic automata
A function µ : S → [0, 1] is a discrete probability distribution on a countable set S if∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1 and µ(s) ≥ 0 for all s. The set of all discrete probability distributions
on S is D(S).
A probabilistic automaton [22] is a quadrupleM = (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) where S is a count-
able set of states, L a finite set of labels or actions, sˆ the initial state, and ϑ a transition
function ϑ : S → ℘f (D(L × S)). Here ℘f (X) is the set of all finite subsets of X . If
ϑ(s) = ∅ then s is a terminal state. We write s→µ for µ ∈ ϑ(s), s ∈ S. Moreover, we
write s `→r for s, r ∈ S whenever s→µ and µ(`, r) > 0. A fully probabilistic automa-
ton is a probabilistic automaton satisfying |ϑ(s)| ≤ 1 for all states. In such automata,
when ϑ(s) 6= ∅, we overload the notation and denote by ϑ(s) the distribution outgoing
from s.
A path in a probabilistic automaton is a sequence σ = s0
`1→ s1 `2→ · · · where
si ∈ S , `i ∈ L and si`i+1→ si+1. A path can be finite in which case it ends with a state.
A path is complete if it is either infinite, or finite ending in a terminal state. Given a
finite path σ, last(σ) denotes its last state. Let Pathss(M) denote the set of all paths,
Paths?s(M) the set of all finite paths, and CPathss(M) the set of all complete paths
of an automaton M , starting from the state s. We will omit s if s = sˆ. Paths are ordered
by the prefix relation, which we denote by ≤. The trace of a path is the sequence of
actions in L∗ ∪ L∞ obtained by removing the states, hence for the above σ we have
trace(σ) = l1l2 . . .. If L′ ⊆ L, then traceL′(σ) is the projection of trace(σ) on the
elements of L′.
Let M = (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) be a (fully) probabilistic automaton, s ∈ S a state, and let
σ ∈ Paths?s(M) be a finite path starting in s. The cone generated by σ is the set of
complete paths 〈σ〉 = {σ′ ∈ CPathss(M) | σ ≤ σ′}. Given a fully probabilistic
automaton M = (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) and a state s, we can calculate the probability value,
denoted byPs(σ), of any finite path σ starting in s as follows:Ps(s) = 1 andPs(σ
`→
s′) = Ps(σ) µ(`, s′), where last(σ)→ µ.
Let Ωs , CPathss(M) be the sample space, and let Fs be the smallest σ-algebra
generated by the cones. ThenP induces a unique probability measure on Fs (which we
will also denote by Ps) such that Ps(〈σ〉) = Ps(σ) for every finite path σ starting in
s. For s = sˆ we write P instead of Psˆ.
Given a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and two events A,B ∈ F with P (B) > 0, the
conditional probability of A given B, P (A | B), is defined as P (A ∩B)/P (B).
2.2 Concepts from Information Theory
For more detailed information on this part we refer to [7]. Let A,B denote two random
variables with corresponding probability distributions pA(·), pB(·), respectively (we
shall omit the subscripts when they are clear from the context). Let A = {a1, . . . , an},
B = {b1, . . . , bm} denote, respectively, the sets of possible values for A and for B.
The entropy of A is defined as H(A) = −∑A p(a) log p(a) and it measures
the uncertainty of A. It takes its minimum value H(A) = 0 when pA(·) is a point
mass (also called delta of Dirac). The maximum value H(A) = log |A| is obtained
when pA(·) is the uniform distribution. Usually the base of the logarithm is set to
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be 2 and the entropy is measured in bits. The conditional entropy of A given B is
H(A|B) = −∑B p(b)∑A p(a|b) log p(a|b), and it measures the uncertainty of A
when B is known. It is well-known that 0 ≤ H(A|B) ≤ H(A). The minimum value,
0, is obtained when A is completely determined by B. The maximum value H(A) is
obtained when A and B are independent. The mutual information between A and B is
defined as I(A;B) = H(A) − H(A|B), and it measures the amount of information
about A that we gain by observing B. It can be shown that I(A;B) = I(B;A) and
0 ≤ I(A;B) ≤ H(A). If C is a third random variable, the conditional mutual informa-
tion between A and B given C is defined as I(A;B|C) = H(A|C)−H(A|B,C).
The (conditional) entropy and mutual information respect the chain rules. Namely,
given the random variables A1, A2, . . . , Ak, B and C, we have:
H(A1, A2, . . . , Ak|C) =
k∑
i=1
H(Ai|A1, . . . , Ai−1, C) (1)
I(A1, A2, . . . , Ak;B|C) =
k∑
i=1
I(Ai;B|A1, . . . , Ai−1, C) (2)
a family ρ = {pv(·)}v of probability measures parametrized on v is called a stochas-
tic kernel1.
A (discrete memoryless) channel is a tuple (A,B, p(·|·)), whereA,B are the sets of
input and output symbols, respectively, and p(b|a) is the probability of observing the
output symbol b when the input symbol is a. These conditional probabilities constitute
the channel matrix. An input distribution pA(·) over A together with the channel de-
termine the joint distribution p(a, b) = p(a|b) · p(a) and consequently I(A;B). The
maximum I(A;B) over all possible input distributions is the channel’s capacity.
3 Discrete channels with memory and feedback
In this section we present the notion of channel with memory and feedback. We assume
a scenario in which the channel is used repeatedly, in a finite temporal sequence of steps
1, . . . , T . Intuitively, memory means that the output at time t depends on the input and
output histories, i.e. on the inputs till time t, and on the output till time t− 1. Feedback
means that the input at time t depends on the outputs till time t− 1.
We adopt the following notation, which appears to be standard in the literature of
channels with memory and feeback.
Convention 1. Given a set of symbols (alphabet) A = {a1, . . . , an}, we use a Greek
letter (α, β, . . . ) to denote a sequence of symbols ordered in time. Given a sequence
α = ai1ai2 . . . aim , the notation αt represents the symbol at time t, i.e. ait , while α
t
represents the sequence αi1αi2 . . . αit . For instance, in the sequence α = a3a7a5, we
have α2 = a7 and α
2 = a3a7. Analogously, ifX is a random variable, thenX
t denotes
the sequence of t consecutive instances X1, . . . , Xt of X .
1 The general definition of stochastic kernel is more complicated (cfr. [29]), but it reduces to
this one in the case of discrete channels, which is what we use in this paper.
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We now define formally the concepts of memory and feedback. Consider a channel
from input A to output B. The channel behavior after T uses can be fully described by
the joint distribution of AT × BT , namely by the probabilities p(αT , βT ). Using the
chain rule, we can decompose these probabilities as follows:
p(αT , βT ) =
T∏
t=1
p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)p(βt|αt, βt−1) (3)
Definition 1. We say that the channel has feedback if, in general, p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) 6=
p(αt|αt−1), i.e. the probability of αt depends, besides αt−1, also on βt−1. Analogously,
we say that the channel has memory if, in general, p(βt|αt, βt−1) 6= p(βt|αt), i.e. the
probability of βt depends on α
t and βt−1.
Note that in the opposite case, i.e. when p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) coincides with p(αt|αt−1)
and p(βt|αt, βt−1) coincides with p(βt|αt), then we have a classical channel (mem-
oryless, and without feedback), in which each use is independent from the previous
ones. The only possible dependency on the history is the one of at on at−1. This is
because A1, . . . , AT are in general correlated, due to the fact that they are produced
by an encoding function. Note that in absence of memory and feedback (3) reduces to
p(αT , βT ) =
∏T
t=1 p(αt, βt) p(βt|αt), which is the standard formula for a classical
channel after T uses.
The above is a very abstract description of a channel with memory and feedback.
We now discuss a more concrete notion following the presentation of [29] . Such a
channel, represented in Figure 2, consists of a sequence of components formally de-
fined as a family of stochastic kernels {p(· |αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 over B. The probabilities
MS: Discuss about this notation: is it
correctly denoting a sequence of matrices,
one for each time t? I’d say it stands for
{p
At|At−1,Bt−1
(·|·)}Tt=1 .
p(βt|αt, βt−1) represent the channel innermost behavior at time t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T : the
internal channel takes the input αt and, depending the history of inputs and outputs so
far, it produces an output symbol βt. The output is then fed back to the encoder with
delay one. On the output side, at time t the encoder takes the message and the past
output symbols βt−1 and produces a channel input symbol αt according to the code
function ϕt. At final time T the decoder takes all the channel outputs β
T and produces
the decoded message Wˆ . The order is the following:
Message W, α1, β1, α2, β2, . . . , αT , βT , Decoded Message Wˆ (4)
Let us now explain the concept of code function. Intuitively, a code function is a
strategy to encode the message into a suitable representation to be transmitted through
the channel. There is a code function for each possible message, and the function is
fixed at the very beginning of the transmission (time t = 0). However, the encoding
can use the information provided via feedback, so each component ϕt (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) of
the code function takes as parameter the history of feedback βt−1 to generate the next
input symbol αt.
Formally, let Ft be the set of all measurable maps ϕt : Bt−1 → A endowed with a
probability distribution, and let Ft be the corresponding random variable. Let FT , FT
denote the Cartesian product on the domain and the random variable, respectively. A
channel code function is an element ϕT = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕT ) ∈ FT .
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Code-
Functions
ϕT
ϕt //
Encoder
{αt = ϕt(βt−1)}Tt=1
αt //
Channel
{p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1
βt //
oo
Decoder
Wˆ = γ(βT )
//Wˆ
Time 0 Delay
βt−1
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Time T + 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _



























_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Time
t = 1 . . . T
Fig. 2. Model for discrete channel with memory and feedback
Note that, by the chain rule, p(ϕT ) =
∏T
t=1 p(ϕt|ϕt−1). Hence the distribution on
FT is uniquely determined by a sequence {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1. We will use the notation
ϕt(βt−1) to represent the A-valued t-tuple (ϕ1, ϕ2(β1), . . . , ϕt(βt−1)).
In Information Theory this kind of channel is used to encode and transmit messages.
If W is a set of messages of cardinality M with typical element w, endowed with a
probability distribution, a channel code is a set of M channel code functions ϕT [w],
interpreted as follows: for message w, if at time t the channel feedback is βt−1, then
the channel encoder outputs ϕt[w](β
t−1). A channel decoder is a map from BT toW
which attempts to reconstruct the input message after observing all the output history
βT from the channel.
3.1 The power of feedback
The original purpose of communication channels models is to represent data transmis-
sion from a source to a receiver. Shannon’s Channel Coding Theorem states for every
channel there is an encoding scheme that allows a transmission rate arbitrary close to
the channel capacity with a negligible probability of error (if the number of uses of
the channel is large enough). Shannon did not explain however how to determine such
an encoding, and a general way to generate an optimal encoding scheme has not been
found yet. The use of feedback, fortunately, can simplify the design of the encoder and
of the decoder. The following example illustrates the idea.
Example 2. Consider a discrete memoryless binary channel {A,B, p(.|.)} with A =
{0, 1}, B = {0, 1,e} and the channel matrix of Table 3. This
0 1 e
0 0.8 0 0.2
1 0 0.8 0.2
Table 3. Channel ma-
trix for binary erasure
channel
kind of channel is called erasure channel because it can lose
(or erase) bits during the transmission with a certain proba-
bility. Namely, any bit has 0.8 probability of being correctly
transmitted, and 0.2 probability of being lost. On the output
side the encoder is able to detect whether the bit was erased
(by receiving an e symbol), but it cannot tell which was the
actual value of the original bit. The Channel Coding Theorem
guarantees that the maximum information transmission rate in
this channel is (2 to the power of) the channel capacity, i.e 0.8
bits per use of the channel.
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Following simple principles described in [7], an encoding that achieves the capac-
ity can be easily obtained if the channel can be used with feedback. The idea is an
adaptation of the stop-and-wait protocol [26, 28]. Suppose that every bit received on the
output end of the channel is fed back noiselessly to the source with delay 1. Define the
encoding as follows: for each bit transmitted, the encoder checks via feedback if the bit
was erased. If not, the encoder moves on to transmit the next of the message. If yes, the
encoder transmits the same bit again.
It is easy to see that with this encoding scheme the transmission rate is 0.8 bit per
usage of the channel, since in 80% of the cases the bit is transmitted properly, and in
20% it is lost and a retransmission is needed.
In the appendix (Section 9) we come back to this example to illustrate more in detail
the design and the function of the encoder and decoder.
Note that the channel capacity in the above example does not increase with the
addition of feedback (it is 0.8 bit per usage of the channel with or without feedback).
This is because the channel is memoryless: feedback does not increase the capacity
of discrete memoryless channels [7]. In general however, feedback does increase the
capacity.
3.2 Directed information and capacity of channels with feedback
In classical Information Theory, the channel capacity, which is related to the channel’s
transmission rate by Shannon’s Channel Coding Theorem, can be obtained as the supre-
mum of the mutual information over all possible input distributions. In the presence of
feedback, however, this correspondence does not longer hold. More specifically, mu-
tual information no longer represents the information flow from AT to BT . Intuitively,
this is due to the fact that mutual information expresses correlation, and therefore it is
increased by feedback. However, feedback, i.e the way the output influences the next
input, is not part of the information to be transmitted. If we want to maintain the cor-
respondence between the transmission rate and capacity, we need to replace the mutual
information with directed information [17].
Definition 2. In a channel with feedback, the directed information from input AT to
output BT is defined as I(AT → BT ) = ∑Tt=1 I(At;Bt|Bt−1). In the other di-
rection, the directed information from BT to AT is defined as: I(BT → AT ) =∑T
t=1 I(At;B
t−1|At−1).
In Section 5 we shall discuss relation between directed information and mutual
information, as well as the correspondence with information leakage. For the moment,
we only present the extension of the concept of capacity.
Let DT = {{p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1} be the set of all input distributions in presence
of feedback. For finite T 2, the capacity of a channel with memory and feedback is:
CT = sup
DT
1
T
I(AT → BT ) (5)
2 For infinite T , see the definition in [29]. However this definition is not used in this paper.
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4 Interactive systems as channels with memory and feedback
Interactive Information Hiding Systems (IIHS) [2] are a variant of probabilistic au-
tomata in which we separate actions into secrets (inputs) and observables (outputs). “In-
teractive” means that secrets and observables can interleave and influence each other.
In this paper we consider only IIHSs of two particular kinds: the fully probabilistic
IIHSs, where there is no nondeterminism, and the secret-nondeterministic (or input-
nondeterministic) IIHSs, where each secret choice is fully nondeterministic.
In this section we formalize the notion of IIHS and we show how to associate to an
IIHS a channel with memory and feedback.
Definition 3. An IIHS is a triple I = (M,A,B), where A and B are disjoint sets of
secrets and observables respectively, M is a probabilistic automaton (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) with
L = A ∪ B, and, for each s ∈ S:
1. either ϑ(s) ⊆ D(A×S) (s is a secret state) or ϑ(s) ⊆ D(B×S) (s is an observable
state)
2. if s `→ r then: if s is secret then r is observable, and if s is observable then r is
secret
3. if ϑ(s) ⊆ D(B × S) then |ϑ(s)| ≤ 1
4. if ϑ(s) ⊆ D(A× S) then either
– |ϑ(s)| ≤ 1 (fully probabilistic IIHS) or
– there exist a′is and s′is (i = 1, . . . , n) such that ϑ(s) = {δ(ai, si)}ni=1, where
δ(ai, si) is the Dirac measure (secret-nondeterministic IIHS).
In the above definition, Conditions 1 and 2 imply that the IIHS is alternating be-
tween secrets and observables. Once unfolded, all the transitions between nodes at two
consecutive depths have either secret actions only, or observable actions only. Moreover,
the occurrences of secret and observable actions alternate. We also assume without loss
of generality that the first level contains secret actions. We call normalized the automata
that satisfy these properties. We note that in our context this is not really a restriction,
because given a IIHS which is not normalized, it is always possible to transform it into
a normalized IIHS which is equivalent to the former one up to a given execution level.
The reader can find in the appendix (Section 9) the formal definition of the transforma-
tion.
Note that Condition 3 means that all observable transitions are fully probabilistic.
Condition 4 means that all secret transtitions are either fully probabilistic or fully non-
deterministic. The latter case is justified by the fact that secret-nondeterministic IIHS
the secret transition scheme, represented in Figure 3(a), is equivalent to the one of Fig-
ure 3(b), where every possible action is allowed to lead to exactly one state.
Note that we do not consider here internal nondeterminism such as, for instance,
that arising from interleaving of concurrent processes. This means that we make a rather
restricted use of the notion of Probabilistic Automaton, but this is enough for our pur-
poses. The presence of nondeterminism gives rise to a new set of problems (see for
example [4]) which are orthogonal to those considered in this paper.
We shows now that the secret and observable traces determine the states, hence
they are enough to retrieve the path. We first need the following auxiliary lemma:
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Lemma 1. Given an IIHS, for every s and ` there ex-
ists a unique r such that s `→ r.
Proof. First we observe that, for both kinds of IIHSs,
if s is a secret state then the property follows imme-
diately from the definition of IIHSs, Condition 1 (see
Figure 4). The case of secret state for a fully proba-
bilistic IIHS is analogous. For secret-nondeterministic
IIHSs, from a secret state there may be several possi-
ble outgoing probability distributions that can be nondeterministically chosen. How-
ever, every possible distribution is a Dirac measure of a different secret symbol. This
means that there is at most one way of performing a transition under some specific
action.
Proposition 1. Given an IIHS, consider two paths σ and σ′. If traceA(σ) = traceA(σ′)
and traceB(σ) = traceB(σ′), then σ = σ′.
Proof. By induction on the length of the traces. The initial state of the automaton is
uniquely determined by the empty (secret and observable) traces. Assume now we are
in a state s uniquely determined by secret and observable traces α and β , respectively. If
smakes a secret transition s a→ s′, then by Lemma 1 there is only one state s′ reachable
from s via an a-transition, and therefore s′ is uniquely determined by the secret trace
α′ = αa and the observable trace β . The case in which smakes an observable transition
is similar.
4.1 Construction of the channel associated to an IIHS
We now show how to associate a channel to an IIHS.
In an interactive systems secrets and observables may interleave and influence each
other. Considering a channel with memory and feedback is a way to capture this rich
behavior. Secrets have a causal influence on observables via the channel, and, in the
presence of interactivity, observables have a causal influence on secrets via feedback.
This alternating mutual influence between secrets and observables can be modeled by
repeated uses of the channels. Each time the channel is used it represents a different
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state of the computation, and the conditional probabilities of observables on secrets
can depend on this state. The addition of memory to the model allows expressing the
dependency of the channel matrix on such a state.
We will see that a secret-nondeterministic IIHS determines a channel as specified
by its stochastic kernel, while a fully probabilistic IIHS determines, additionally, the
input distribution.
In Section 6 we will give an extensive and detailed example of how to make such a
construction for a real security protocol.
Given a path σ of length 2t− 1, we will denote traceA(σ) by αt, and traceB(σ) by
βt−1.
Definition 4. Let I be an IIHS. For each t, the channel’s stochastic kernel correspond-
ing to I is defined as p(βt|αt, βt−1) = ϑ(s)(βt, s′), where s is the state reached from
the root via the path σ whose secret and observable trace are αt and βt−1 respectively.
Note that s and s′ in the previous definition are well defined: by Proposition 1, s is
unique, and since the choice of βt is fully probabilistic, s
′ is also unique.
The following example illustrates how to apply Definition 4, with the help of Propo-
sition 1, to build the channel matrix of a simple example.
Example 3. Let us consider an extended version of the website interactive system of
Figure 1. We maintain the general definition of the system, i.e, there are two possi-
ble buyers (rich and poor represented by rc. and pr., respectively) and two possible
products (cheap and expensive, represented by chp. and exp., respectively). We still
assume that offers are observable, since they are visible to everyone on the website,
but the identity of buyers should be kept secret. We consider two consecutive rounds
of offers and buys, which implies that, after normalization, T = 3. Figure 5 shows an
automaton for this example in normalized form. Transitions with null probability are
omitted, and the symbol a∗ is used as a place holder to achieve the normalized IIHS
(see Appendix).
To construct the stochastic kernels {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1, we need to determine the
conditional probability of an observable at time t given the history up to time t.
Let us take the case t = 2 and compute the conditional probability of the observable
β2 = cheap given that the history of secrets until time t = 2 is α
2 = a∗, poor and
the history of observables is β1 = expensive. Applying Definition 4, we see that
p(β2 = cheap|α2 = a∗, poor, β1 = expensive) = ϑ(s)(cheap, s′). By Proposition 1,
the traces α2 = a∗, poor, β
1 = expensive determine a unique state s in the automaton,
namely, the state s = 5. Moreover, from the state 5 a unique transition labelled with the
action cheap is possible, leading to the state s′ = 11. Therefore, we can conclude that
p(β2 = cheap|α2 = a∗, poor, β1 = expensive) = ϑ(s = 5)(cheap, s′ = 11) = p23.
Similarly, with t = 1 and history α1 = a∗, β
0 = , the observable symbol β1 =
expensive can be observed with probability p(β1 = expensive|α1 = a∗, β0 = ) =
ϑ(s = 0)(cheap, s′ = 2) = p1.
If I is fully probabilistic, then it determines also the input distribution and the de-
pendency of αt on β
t−1 (feedback) and on αt−1.
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Definition 5. Let I be an IIHS. If I is fully probabilistic, the associated channel has a
conditional input distribution for each t defined as p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) = ϑ(s)(αt, s′),
where s is the state reached from the root via the path σ whose secret and observable
traces are αt−1 and βt−1 respectively.
Example 4. Since the system of Example 3 is fully probabilistic, we can calculate the
values of the conditional probabilities {p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1.
Let us take, for instance, the case where t = 2 and compute the conditional proba-
bility of secret α2 = poor given that the history of secrets until time t = 2 is α
1 = a∗
and the history of observables is β1 = expensive. Applying Definition 5, we see that
p(α2 = poor|α1 = a∗, β1 = expensive) = ϑ(s)(poor, s′). By Proposition 1, the
traces α1 = a∗, β
1 = expensive determine a unique state s in the automaton, namely,
the state s = 2. Moreover, from the state 2 a unique transition labelled with the ac-
tion poor is possible, leading to the state s′ = 5. Therefore, we can conclude that
p(α2 = poor|α1 = a∗, β1 = expensive) = ϑ(s = 2)(poor, s′ = 5) = q12.
Similarly, with t = 3 and history α2 = a∗, rich, β
2 = cheap, expensive, the secret
symbol α3 = rich can be observed with probability p(α3 = rich|α2 = α∗, rich, β0 =
cheap, expensive) = ϑ(s = 10)(cheap, s′ = 22) = q24.
−1
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Fig. 5. The normalized IIHS for the extended website example
4.2 Lifting the channel inputs to reaction functions
Definitions 4 and 5 show how to obtain the the joint probabilities p(αt, βt) for a fully
probabilistic IIHS. We still need to show in what sense this joint probability distribution
defines an information-theoretic channel.
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The {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 determined by the IIHS correspond to a channel’s stochas-
tic kernel. The problem resides in the conditional probabilities {p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1.
In an information-theoretic channel, the value of αt is determined in the encoder by
a deterministic function ϕt(β
t−1). Therefore, inside the encoder there is no possibil-
ity for a probabilistic description of αt. The solution is to externalize this probabilistic
behavior to the code functions.
As shown in [29], the original channel with feedback from input symbols AT to
output symbols BT can be lifted to an equivalent channel without feedback from code
functions FT to output symbols BT . This transformation also allows us to calculate the
channel capacity. Let {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1 be a sequence of code function stochastic ker-
nels and let {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 be a channel with memory and feedback. The channel
from FT to BT is constructed using a joint measure Q(ϕT , αT , βT ) that respects the
following constraints:
Definition 6. A measure Q(ϕT , αT , βT ) is said to be consistent with respect to the
code function stochastic kernels {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1 and the channel {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1
if, for each t:
1. There is no feedback to the code functions:Q(ϕt|ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1) = p(ϕt|ϕt−1).
2. The input is a function of the past outputs:Q(αt|ϕt, αt−1, βt−1) = δ{ϕt(βt−1)}(αt)
where δ is the Dirac measure.
3. The properties of the underlying channel are preserved:
Q(βt|F t = ϕt, At = αt, Bt−1 = βt−1) = p(βt|αt, βt−1)
The following result states that there is only one consistent measureQ(ϕT , αT , βT ):
Theorem 2 ([29]). Given {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1 and a channel {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1, there
exists only one consistent measure Q(ϕT , αT , βT ). Furthermore the channel from FT
to BT is given by:
Q(βt|ϕt, βt−1) = p(βt|ϕt(βt−1), βt−1) (6)
Since in our setting the concept of encoder makes little sense as there is no in-
formation to encode, we externalize the probabilistic behavior of αt as follows. Code
functions become a single set of reaction functions {ϕt}Tt=1 with βt−1 as parameter
(the message w does not play a role any more). Reaction functions can be seen as a
model of how the environment reacts to given system outputs, producing new system
inputs (they do not play a role of encoding a message). These reaction functions are
endowed with a probability distribution that generates the probabilistic behavior of the
values of αt.
Definition 7. A reactor is a distribution on reaction functions, i.e., a stochastic ker-
nel {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1. A reactor R is consistent with a fully probabilistic IIHS I if it
induces the compatible distribution Q(ϕT , αT , βT ) such that, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
Q(αt|αt−1, βt−1) = p(αt|αt−1, βt−1), where the latter is the probability distribution
induced by I.
The main result of this section states that for any fully probabilistic IIHS there is a
reactor that generates the probabilistic behavior of the IIHS.
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Lemma 2. Let X ,Y be non-empty finite sets, and let x˜ ∈ X , y˜ ∈ Y . Let p : X × Y →
[0, 1] be a function such that, for every x ∈ X , we have:∑y∈Y p(x, y) = 1. Then:∑
f∈X→Y
f(x˜)=y˜
∏
x∈X
p(x, f(x)) = p(x˜, y˜)
Proof. By induction on the number of elements of X .
Base case: X = {x˜}. In this case:∑
f∈X→Y
f(x˜)=y˜
∏
x∈X
p(x, f(x)) = p(x˜, f(x˜)) = p(x˜, y˜)
Inductive case: Let X = X ′ ∪ {x˚}, with x˜ ∈ X ′ and x˚ /∈ X ′. Then:∑
f∈X ′∪{x˚}→Y
f(x˜)=y˜
∏
x∈X ′∪{x˚}
p(x, f(x))
= (by distributivity)

∑
f∈X ′→Y
f(x˜)=y˜
∏
x∈X ′
p(x, f(x))
 ·
∑
g∈{x˚}→Y
p(˚x, g(˚x))
= (by the assumption)∑
f∈X ′→Y
f(x˜)=y˜
∏
x∈X ′
p(x, f(x))
= (by the induction hypothesis)
p(x˜, y˜)
Theorem 3. Let I be a fully probabilistic IIHS inducing the joint probability distribu-
tion p(αt, βt), 1 ≤ t ≤ T , on secret and observable traces. It is always possible to
construct a channel with memory and feedback, and an associated probability distribu-
tion Q(ϕT , αT , βT ), which corresponds to I in the sense that, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T , αt,
βt, the equality Q(αt, βt) = p(αt, βt) holds.
Proof. First of all we note that, by probability laws, Q(αt, βt) =
∑
ϕt Q(ϕ
t, αt, βt).
So we need to show that
∑
ϕt Q(ϕ
t, αt, βt) = p(αt, βt) by induction on t.
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Base case: t = 1. Let us define Q(ϕ1|) = p(ϕ1()) and Q(β1|α1, ) = p(β1|α1).
Then:∑
ϕ1
Q(ϕ1, α1, β1) =
∑
ϕ1
Q(ϕ1, α1, β1)
=
∑
ϕ1
Q(ϕ1|, , )Q(α1|ϕ1, , )Q(β1|ϕ1, α1, ) (by the chain rule)
=
∑
ϕ1
Q(ϕ1|)δ{ϕ1()}(α1)Q(β1|α1, ) (by Definition 6)
=
∑
ϕ1
p(ϕ1())δ{ϕ1()}(α1)p(β1|α1) (by construction of Q)
= p(α1)p(β1|α1) (by definition of δ)
= p(α1, β1)
= p(α1, β1)
Inductive case: Let us define Q(βt|αt, βt−1) = p(βt|αt, βt−1), and
Q(ϕt|ϕt−1) =
∏
βt−1
p(ϕt(β
t−1)|ϕt−1(βt−2), βt−1)
Note that, if we consider X = {βt−1 | βi ∈ B, 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1}, Y = A, and
p(βt−1, αt) = p(αt|ϕt−1(βt−2), βt−1), then X , Y and p satisfy the hypothesis of
Lemma 2.
Then:∑
ϕt
Q(ϕt, αt, βt)
= (by the chain rule)∑
ϕt
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)Q(ϕt|ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)Q(αt|ϕt, αt−1, βt−1)Q(βt|ϕt, αt, βt−1)
= (by Definition 6)∑
ϕt
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)Q(ϕt|ϕt−1)δ{ϕt(βt−1)}(αt)Q(βt|αt, βt−1)
= (by construction of Q)
∑
ϕt
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)
 ∏
β′t−1
p(ϕt(β
′t−1)|ϕt−1(β′t−2), β′t−1)
 δ{ϕt(βt−1)}(αt)p(βt|αt, βt−1)
= (by definition of δ)
∑
ϕt
ϕt(β
t−1)=αt
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)
 ∏
β′t−1
p(ϕt(β
′t−1)|ϕt−1(β′t−2), β′t−1)
 p(βt|αt, βt−1)
=
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∑
ϕt−1
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)p(βt|αt, βt−1)
∑
ϕt
ϕt(β
t−1)=αt
∏
β′t−1
p(ϕt(β
′t−1)|ϕt−1(β′t−2), β′t−1)
= (by Lemma 2)∑
ϕt−1
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1) · p(βt|αt, βt−1) · p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)
=
p(βt|αt, βt−1) · p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) ·
∑
ϕt−1
Q(ϕt−1, αt−1, βt−1)
= (by induction hypothesis)
p(βt|αt, βt−1) · p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) · p(αt−1, βt−1)
= (by the chain rule)
p(αt, βt)
Corollary 1. Let a I be a fully probabilistic IIHS. Let {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 be a se-
quence of stochastic kernels and {p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1 a sequence of input distribu-
tions defined by I according to Definitions 4 and 5. Then the reactorR = {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1
compatible with respect to the I is given by:
p(ϕ1) = p(α1|α0, β0) = p(α1) (7)
p(ϕt|ϕt−1) =
∏
βt−1
p(ϕt(β
t−1)|ϕt−1(βt−2), βt−1), 2 ≤ t ≤ T (8)
Figure 6 depicts the model for IIHS. Note that, in relation to Figure 2, there are some
simplifications: (1) no message w is needed; (2) the encoder becomes an “interactor”;
(3) the decoder is not used. At the beginning, a reaction function sequence ϕT is chosen
and then the channel is used T times. At each usage t, the interactor produces the next
input symbol αt by applying the reaction function ϕt to the fed back output β
t−1. Then
the channel produces an output βt based on the stochastic kernel p(βt|αt, βt−1). The
output is then fed back to the encoder, which uses it for producing the next input.
We conclude this section by remarking on an intriguing coincidence: The notion of
reaction function sequence ϕT , on the IIHSs, corresponds to the notion of deterministic
scheduler [22]. In fact, each reaction function ϕt selects the next step, αt, on the basis
of the βt−1 and αt−1 (generated by ϕt−1), and βt−1, αt−1 represent the path until that
state.
5 Leakage in Interactive Systems
In this section we propose a definition for the notion of leakage in interactive systems.
We first argue that mutual information is not the correct notion, and we prose to replace
it with the directed information instead.
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Fig. 6. Channel with memory and feedback model for IIHS
In the case of channels with memory and feedback, mutual information is defined
as I(AT ;BT ) = H(AT ) − H(AT |BT ), and it is still symmetric (i.e. I(AT ;BT ) =
I(BT ;AT )). Since the roles ofAT andBT in I are interchangeable, this concept cannot
capture causality, in the sense that it does not imply thatAT causesBT , nor conversely.
Mutual information expresses correlation between the sequences of random variables
AT and BT .
Mathematically, for T usages of the channel, the mutual information I(AT ;BT )
can be expressed with the help of the chain rule of (2) in the following form.
I(AT ;BT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(AT ;Bt|Bt−1) (9)
In the equation above, each term of the sum is the mutual information between the
random variable Bt and the whole sequence of random variables AT = A1, . . . , AT ,
given the history Bt−1. The equation emphasizes that at time 1 ≤ t ≤ T , even though
only the inputs αt = α1, α2, . . . , αt have been fed to the channel, the whole sequence
AT , including At+1, At+2, . . . , AT , has a statistical correlation with Bt. Indeed, in the
presence of feedback, Bt may influence At+1, At+2, . . . , AT .
In order to show how the concept of directed information contrasts with the above,
let us recall its definition:
I(AT → BT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(At;Bt|Bt−1).
I(BT → AT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(At;B
t−1|At−1).
These notions capture the concept of causality, to which the definition of mutual in-
formation is indifferent. The correlation between inputs and outputs I(AT ;BT ) is split
into the information I(AT → BT ) that flows from input to output through the channel
and the information I(BT → AT ) that flows from output to the input via feedback.
Note that the directed information is not symmetric: the flow from AT to BT takes into
account the correlation between At and Bt, while the flow from BT to AT takes into
account the correlation between Bt−1 and At.
It was proved in [29] that
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I(AT ;BT ) = I(AT → BT ) + I(BT → AT ) (10)
i.e, the mutual information is the sum of the directed information flow in both senses.
Note that this formulation highlights the symmetry of mutual information from yet
another perspective.
Once we split mutual information into directed information in the two opposite
directions, it is important to understand the different role that the information flow in
each direction plays. I(AT → BT ) represents the system behavior: via the channel the
information flows from inputs to outputs according to the system specification, modeled
by the channel stochastic kernels. This flow represents the amount of information an
attacker can gain from the inputs by observing the outputs, and we argue that this is the
real information leakage.
On the other hand, I(BT → AT ) represents how the environment reacts to the sys-
tem: given the system outputs, the environment produces new inputs. We argue that the
information flow from outputs to inputs is independent of any particular system: it is
a characteristic of the environment itself. Hence, if an attacker knows how the environ-
ment reacts to outputs, i.e the probabilistic behavior of the environment reactions given
the system outputs, this knowledge is part of the a priori knowledge of the adversary. As
a further justification, observe that this is a natural extension of the classical approach
case, where the choice of secrets is seen as external to the system, i.e. determined by the
environment. The probability distribution on the secrets constitutes the a priori knowl-
edge and does not count as leakage. In order to encompass the classical approach, in our
extended model we should preserve this principle, and a natural way to do so is to con-
sider the secret choices, at every stage of the computation, as external. Their probability
distributions, which are now in general conditional probability distributions depending
on the history of secrets and observables, should therefore be considered as part of the
external knowledge, and not counted as leakage.
The following example supports our claim that, in the presence of feedback, mutual
information is not a correct notion of leakage.
Example 5. Consider the discrete memoryless channel with secret alphabetA = {a1, a2}
and observable alphabet B = {b1, b2} whose matrix is represented in Table 4.
b1 b2
a1 0.5 0.5
a2 0.5 0.5
Table 4. Channel ma-
trix for Example 5
Suppose that the channel is used with feedback, in such a
way that, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we have αt+1 = a1 if βt = b1,
and αt+1 = a2 if βt = b2. It is easy to show that if T ≥ 2 then
I(AT ;BT ) 6= 0. However, there is no leakage from AT to BT ,
since the rows of the matrix are all equal. We have indeed that
I(AT → BT ) = 0, and the mutual information I(AT ;BT ) is
only due to the feedback information flow I(BT → AT ).
Having in mind the above discussion, we now propose a notion of information flow
based on our model. We follow the idea of defining leakage and maximum leakage using
the concepts of mutual information and capacity, making the necessary adaptations.
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As discussed in the introduction, in the non interactive case the definition of leakage
as mutual information, for a single use of the channel, is
I(A;B) = H(A)−H(A|B)
(cfr. for instance [4, 15]). This corresponds to view the leakage as difference between
the a priori invulnerability degree,H(A), and the a posteriori one,H(A|B). The model
of attacker which induces an invulnerability degree corresponding to Shannon entropy
is discussed by Ko¨pf and Basin in [15].
In the interactive case, we can extend this notion by considering the leakage at every
step t as given by
I(At;Bt|Bt−1) = H(At|Bt−1)−H(At|Bt, Bt−1)
The notion of attack is the same modulo the fact that we consider all the input from the
beginning till step t, and the difference in its vulnerability induced by the observation
of Bt (the output at step t), taking into account the observation history Bt−1. It is then
natural to consider as total leakage the summation of the contributions I(At;Bt|Bt−1)
for all the steps t. This is exactly the notion of directed information (cfr. Definition 2):
I(BT → AT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(At;Bt|Bt−1)
Definition 8. The information leakage of a fully probabilistic IIHS is defined as the
directed information I(AT → BT ) of the associated channel with memory and feed-
back.
We now show an equivalent formulation of directed information that brings to a new
interpretation in terms of attack model. First we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. I(BT → AT ) = H(AT )−∑Tt=1H(At|At−1, Bt−1)
Proof.
I(BT → AT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(At;B
t−1|At−1) (by Definition 2)
=
T∑
t=1
(
H(At|At−1)
−H(At|At−1, Bt−1)
)
(by definition of mutual info.)
= H(AT )−
T∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Bt−1) (by the chain rule)
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Next proposition points out the announced alternative formulation of directed infor-
mation from input to output:
Proposition 2. I(AT → BT ) = ∑Tt=1H(At|At−1, Bt−1)−H(AT |BT )
Proof.
I(AT → BT ) = I(AT ;BT )− I(BT → AT ) (by (10))
= I(AT ;BT )−H(AT )
+
T∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Bt−1) (by Lemma 3)
= H(AT )−H(AT |BT )−H(AT )
+
T∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Bt−1) (by definition of mutual info.)
=
T∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Bt−1)−H(AT |BT )
We note that the term
∑T
t=1H(At|At−1, Bt−1) can be seen as the entropy HR of
the reactor R, i.e. the entropy of the inputs, taking into account their dependency on the
previous outputs. This brings to an intriguing alternative interpretation of leakage:
Remark 1. The leakage can be seen as the difference between the a priori invulnerabil-
ity degree of the whole secret AT , assuming that the attacker knows the distribution of
the reactor, and the a posteriori invulnerability degree, after the adversary has observed
the whole output BT .
In Section 6 we give an extensive and detailed example of how to calculate the
leakage for a real security protocol.
In the case of secret-nondeterministic IIHS, we have a stochastic kernel but no distri-
bution on the code functions. In this case it seems natural to consider the worst leakage
over all possible distributions on code functions. This is exactly the concept of capacity.
Definition 9. The maximum leakage of a secret-nondeterministic IIHS is defined as the
capacity CT of the associated channel with memory and feedback (cfr. (5)).
A comparison with the definition of Gray (cfr. [13], Definition 5.3) is in order. As
explained in the introduction, Gray’s model is more complicated than ours, because
it assumes that low and high variables are present at both ends of the channel. If we
restrict the definition of Gray’s capacity CG to our case, by eliminating the low input
and the high output, we obtain the following formula:
CGT = supDT
1
T
T∑
t=1
I(At−1;Bt|Bt−1) (11)
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By examining (11) against (9) and Definition 2, we can see that the only difference is
that (11) considers the correlation between Bt andAt−1 instead than At. This seems to
be intentional (cfr. [13], discussion after Definition 4.1). We are not sure why CG is
defined in this way, our best guess is that the high values must be those of the previous
time step in order to encompass the theory of McLean [18]. In any case, Gray’s conjec-
ture that CGT corresponds to the channel transmission rate does not hold. For instance, it
is easy to see that for T = 1 we always have CGT = 0, but there obviously are channels
which can transmit a non-zero amount of information even with one single use.
We conclude this section by showing that our approach to the notion of leakage
generalizes the classical approach (based on mutual information) to the case of feed-
back. The idea is that, if a channel does not have feedback, then I(BT → AT ) = 0 and
therefore I(AT ;BT ) = I(AT → BT ). In our opinion, the fact that mutual information
turns out to be a particular case of directed information helps justifying the former as a
good measure of information flow, despite its symmetry: in channels without feedback
it is a good measure because it coincides with directed information from input to output.
Lemma 4. In absence of feedback, I(BT → AT ) = 0
Proof. When feedback is not allowed,Bt andAt are independent for 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Then:
I(BT → AT ) =
T∑
t=1
I(At;B
t−1|At−1) (by Definition 2)
=
T∑
t=1
(H(At|At−1)−H(At|At−1, Bt−1)) (by definition of mutual information)
=
T∑
t=1
(H(At|At−1)−H(At|At−1)) (by the independence of Bt−1 and At)
= 0
Proposition 3. In absence of feedback, leakage can be equivalently defined as directed
information or as mutual information. Similarly, in absence of feedback, the maximum
leakage can be equivalently defined as directed capacity or as capacity.
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 4 and (10).
6 Modeling IIHSs as channels: An example
In this section we show the application of our approach to the Cocaine Auction Pro-
tocol [25]. The formalization of this protocol in terms of IIHSs using our framework
makes it possible to prove the claim in [25] suggesting that if the seller knows the iden-
tity of the bidders then the (strong) anonymity guaranties are not provided anymore.
Let us consider a scenario in which several mobsters are gathered around a table.
An auction is about to be held in which one of them offers his next shipment of co-
caine to the highest bidder. The seller describes the merchandise and proposes a starting
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price. The others then bid increasing amounts until there are no bids for 30 consecu-
tive seconds. At that point the seller declares the auction closed and arranges a secret
appointment with the winner to deliver the goods.
The basic protocol is fairly simple and is organized as a succession of rounds of
bidding. Round i starts with the seller announcing the bid price bi for that round. Buyers
have t seconds to make an offer (i.e. to say yes, meaning “I’m willing to buy at the
current bid price bi”). As soon as one buyer anonymously says yes, he becomes the
winner wi of that round and a new round begins. If nobody says anything for t seconds,
round i is concluded by timeout and the auction is won by the winner wi−1 of the
previous round, if one exists. If the timeout occurs during round 0, this means that
nobody made any offers at the initial price b0, so there is no sale.
Although our framework allows the formalization of this protocol for an arbitrary
number of bidders and bidding rounds, for illustration purposes we will consider the
case of two bidders (Candlemaker and Scarface) and two rounds of bids. Furthermore,
we assume that the initial bid is always 1 dollar, so the first bid does not need to be
announced by the seller. In each turn the seller can choose how much he wants to
increase the current bid value. This is done by adding an increment to the last bid.
There are two options of increments, namely inc1 (1 dollar) and inc2 (2 dollars). In
that way, bi+1 is either bi + inc1 or bi + inc2. We can describe this protocol as a
normalized IIHS I = (M,A,B, C), whereA = {Candlemaker,Scarface, a∗} is the set
of secret actions, B = {inc1, inc2, b∗} is the set of observable actions, C = ∅ is the
set of hidden actions, and the probabilistic automaton M is represented in Figure 7. For
clarity reasons, transitions with probability 0 are not represented in the automaton. Note
that the special secret action a∗ represents the situation where neither Candlemaker nor
Scarface bid. The special observable action b∗ is only possible after no one has bidden,
and signals the end of the auction and, therefore, no further bids are allowed.
Cmp1
Sf p2
a∗ p3
inc1q4
inc2
q5
inc1q6
inc2
q7 b∗1
Cm
p9 Sf
p10
a∗ p11 Cmp12 Sf
p13
a∗ p14 Cmp15 Sf
p16
a∗ p17 Cmp18 Sf
p19
a∗ p20 a∗
1
inc1
q22
inc2
q23
inc1
q24
inc2
q25
b∗
1
inc1
q27
inc2
q28
inc1
q29
inc2
q30
b∗
1
inc1
q32
inc2
q33
inc1
q34
inc2
q35
b∗
1
inc1
q37
inc2
q38
inc1
q39
inc2
q40
b∗
1
b∗
1
Fig. 7. Cocaine Auction example
Table 5 shows all the stochastic kernels for this example.
The interested reader can find the construction of the reaction functions in the Ap-
pendix.
23
(a) t=1, p(β1|α1, β0)
α1 → β1 inc1 inc2 b∗
Candlemaker q4 q5 0
Scarface q6 q7 0
a∗ 0 0 1
(b) t = 2, p(β2|α2, β1)
α1, β1, α2 → β2 inc1 inc2 b∗
Candlemaker,inc1,Candlemaker q22 q23 0
Candlemaker,inc1,Scarface q24 q25 0
Candlemaker,inc1,a∗ 0 0 1
Candlemaker,inc2,Candlemaker q27 q28 0
Candlemaker,inc2,Scarface q29 q30 0
Candlemaker,inc2,a∗ 0 0 1
Scarface,inc1,Candlemaker q32 q33 0
Scarface,inc1,Scarface q34 q35 0
Scarface,inc1,a∗ 0 0 1
Scarface,inc2,Candlemaker q37 q38 0
Scarface,inc2,Scarface q39 q40 0
Scarface,inc2,a∗ 0 0 1
a∗,b∗,a∗ 0 0 1
All other lines 0 0 1
Table 5. Stochastic kernels for the Cocaine Auction example.
6.1 Calculating the information leakage
Let us now calculate the information leakage for this example using the concepts from
Section 5. We are going to analyze three different scenarios:
Example a: There is feedback, but the probability of an observable does not depend
on the history of secrets. In the auction protocol, this corresponds to a scenario
where the probability of one of the mobsters to bid can depend on the increment
imposed by the seller, but the history of who has previously bid in the past has no
influence on how the seller chooses the bid increment in the coming turns. In other
words, the seller cannot use the information of who has been bidding to change his
strategy of defining the new increments. This situation corresponds to the original
description of the protocol in [25], where the seller does not have access to the
identity of the bidder, for the sake of anonymity preservation. In general, we have
p(βt|αt, βt−1) = p(βt|βt−1) for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T . However, there is an exception:
if there is no bidder, the case modeled by the secret being a∗, then the auction
terminates, which is signaled by the observable b∗.
Example b: This is the most general case, without any restrictions. The presence of
feedback allows the probability of the bidder to depend of the increment on the
price. For instance, if Candlemaker is richer than Scarface, it is more likely that
the former bids if the increment in the price is inc2 instead of inc1. Also, the
probability of an observable can depend on the history of secrets, i.e., in general
p(βt|αt, βt−1) 6= p(βt|βt−1) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T . This scenario can represent a situation
where the seller is corrupted and can use his information to affect the outcome of
the auction. As an example, suppose that the seller is a friend of Scarface and he
wants to help him in the auction. One way of doing so is to check who was the
winner of the last bidding round. Whenever the winner is Candlemaker, the seller
chooses as increment the small value inc1, hoping that it will give Scarface a good
chance to bid in the next round. On the other hand, whenever the seller detects that
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the winner is Scarface, he chooses as the next increment the greater value inc2,
hoping that it will minimize the chances of Candlemaker to bid in the next round
(and therefore maximizing the chances of the auction to end up having Scarface as
the final winner).
Example c: There is no feedback. In the cocaine auction, we can have the (maybe
unrealistic) situation in which the increment added to the bid has no influence on the
probability of Candlemaker or Scarface being the bidder. Mathematically, we have
p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) = p(αt|αt−1) for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T . However, as in Example b,
we do not impose any restriction to p(βt|αt, βt−1).
For each scenario we need to fill in the values of the probabilities in the protocol
tree in Figure 7. The probabilities for each example are listed in Table 6.
Table 7 shows a comparison between some relevant values on the three cases.
In Example a, since the probability of observables does not depend on the history
of secrets, there is (almost) no information flowing from the input to the output, and
the directed information I(AT → BT ) is close to zero, i.e., the leakage is low. The
only reason why the leakage is not zero is because the end of an auction needs to be
signaled. However, due to presence of feedback, the directed information in the other
sense I(BT → AT ) is non-zero, and so is the mutual information I(AT ;BT ). This is
an example where the mutual information does not correspond to the real information
leakage, since some (in this case, most) of the correlation between input and output can
be attributed to the feedback.
In Example b the information flow from input to output I(AT → BT ) is signifi-
cantly higher than zero, but still, due to feedback, the information flow from outputs to
inputs I(BT → AT ) is not zero and the mutual information I(AT ;BT ) is higher than
the directed information I(AT → BT ).
In Example c, the absence of feedback implies that I(BT → AT ) is zero. In that
case the values of I(AT ;BT ) and I(AT → BT ) coincide, and represent the real leak-
age.
7 Topological properties of IIHSs and their Capacity
In this section we show how to extend to IIHSs the notion of pseudometric defined
in [9] for Concurrent Labelled Markov Chains, and we prove that the capacity of the
corresponding channels is a continuous function with respect to this pseudometric. The
pseudometric construction is sound for general IIHSs, but the result on capacity is only
valid for secret-nondeterministic IIHSs.
Given a set of states S, a pseudometric is a function d that yields a non-negative real
number for each pair of states and satisfies the following: d(s, s) = 0; d(s, t) = d(t, s),
and d(s, t) ≤ d(s, u) + d(u, t). We say that a pseudometric d is c-bounded if ∀s, t :
d(s, t) ≤ c, where c is a positive real number.
Note that, in contrast to metrics, in pseudometrics two elements can have distance 0
without being identical. The reason for considering pseudometrics instead than metrics
is because the purpose is to extend the notion of (probabilistic) bisimulation: having
distance 0 will correspond to being bisimilar.
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Probability Example a Example b Example c
variable value value value
p1 0.7 0.7 0.7
p2 0.2 0.2 0.2
p3 0.1 0.1 0.1
q4 0.9 0.1 0.1
q5 0.1 0.9 0.9
q6 0.9 0.9 0.9
q7 0.1 0.1 0.1
p9 0.6 0.6 0.6
p10 0.3 0.3 0.3
p11 0.1 0.1 0.1
p12 0.5 0.5 0.6
p13 0.3 0.3 0.3
p14 0.2 0.2 0.1
p15 0.4 0.4 0.5
p16 0.4 0.4 0.2
p17 0.2 0.2 0.3
p18 0.6 0.6 0.5
p19 0.3 0.3 0.2
p20 0.1 0.1 0.3
q22 0.4 0.1 0.1
q23 0.6 0.9 0.9
q24 0.7 0.9 0.9
q25 0.3 0.1 0.1
q27 0.2 0.1 0.1
q28 0.8 0.9 0.9
q29 0.1 0.9 0.9
q30 0.9 0.1 0.1
q32 0.4 0.1 0.1
q33 0.6 0.9 0.9
q34 0.7 0.9 0.9
q35 0.3 0.1 0.1
q37 0.2 0.1 0.1
q38 0.8 0.9 0.9
q39 0.1 0.9 0.9
q40 0.9 0.1 0.1
Table 6. Values of the probabilities in Figure 7 in 3 different examples.
We now define a complete lattice on pseudometrics, in order to define the distance
between IIHSs as the greatest fixpoint of a particular transformation, in line with the
coinductive theory of bisimilarity. Since larger bisimulations identify more, the natural
extension of the ordering to pseudometrics must shorten the distances as we go up in
the lattice:
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Interpretation Symbol Example a Example b Example c
Input uncertainty H(AT ) 2.3833 2.4891 2.3607
Reactor uncertainty HR 2.3768 2.4832 2.3607
A posteriori uncertainty H(AT |BT ) 1.3683 0.0677 0.6646
Mutual information I(AT ;BT ) = H(AT )−H(AT |BT ) 1.0150 1.8214 1.6961
Leakage I(AT → BT ) = HR −H(AT |BT ) 1.0085 1.8155 1.6961
Feedback information I(BT → AT ) 0.185955 0.0060 0.0000
Table 7. Values for the examples.
Definition 10. M is the class of 1-bounded pseudometrics on states with the ordering
d  d′ if ∀s, s′ ∈ S : d(s, s′) ≥ d′(s, s′).
It is easy to see that (M,) is a complete lattice. In order to define pseudometrics
on IIHSs, we now need to lift the pseudometrics on states to pseudometrics on distribu-
tions in D(L× S). Following standard lines [30, 9, 8], we apply the construction based
on the Kantorovich metric [14].
Definition 11. For d ∈ M, and µ, µ′ ∈ D(L × S), we define d(µ, µ′) (overloading
the notation d) as d(µ, µ′) = max
∑
(`i,si)∈L×S(µ(`i, si) − µ′(`i, si))xi where the
maxima is taken over all possible values of the xi’s, subject to the constraints 0 ≤ xi ≤
1 and xi − xj ≤ dˆ((`i, si), (`j , sj)), where
dˆ((`i, si), (`j , sj)) =
{
1 if `i 6= `j
d(si, sj) otherwise
It can be shown that with this definition m is a pseudometric on D(L × S).
Definition 12. A pseudometric d ∈ M is a bisimulation pseudometric3 if, for all  ∈
[0, 1), d(s, s′) ≤  implies that if s → µ, then there exists some µ′ such that s′ → µ′
and d(µ, µ′) ≤ .
Note that it is not necessary to require the converse of the condition in Definition
12 to get a complete analogy with bisimulation: the converse is indeed implied by the
symmetry of d as a pseudometric. Note also that we prohibit  to be 1 because through-
out this paper 1 represents the maximum distance, which includes the case where one
state may perform a transition and the other may not.
The greatest bisimulation pseudometric is
dmax =
⊔
{d ∈M | d is a bisimulation pseudometric}
We now characterize dmax as a fixed point of a monotonic function Φ onM. Eventually
we are interested in the distance between IIHSs, and for the sake of simplicity, from
3 In literature a pseudometric with this property is also known as bisimulation metric, although
it is still a pseudometric.
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now on we consider only the distance between states belonging to different IIHSs. The
extension to the general case is trivial. For clarity purposes, we assume that different
IIHSs have disjoint sets of states.
Definition 13. Given two IIHSs with transition relations θ and θ′ respectively, and a
preudometric d on states, define Φ :M→M as:
Φ(d)(s, s′) =

maxi d(si, s
′
i) if ϑ(s) = {δ(a1,s1), . . . , δ(am,sm)}
and ϑ′(s′) = {δ(a1,s′1), . . . , δ(am,s′m)}
d(µ, µ′) if ϑ(s) = {µ} and ϑ′(s′) = {µ′}
0 if ϑ(s) = ϑ′(s′) = ∅
1 otherwise
It is easy to see that the definition of Φ is a particular case of the function F defined
in [9, 8]. Hence it can be proved, by adapting the proofs of the analogous results in [9,
8], that F (d) is a pseudometric, and that the following property holds.
Lemma 5. For  ∈ [0, 1), Φ(d)(s, s′) ≤  holds if and only if whenever s → µ, there
exists some µ′ such that s′ → µ′ and d(µ, µ′) ≤ .
Corollary 2. A pseudometric d is a bisimulation pseudometric iff d  Φ(d).
As a consequence of Corollary 2, we have that dmax =
⊔{d ∈ M | d  Φ(d)},
and still as a particular case of F in [9, 8], we have that Φ is monotonic onM.
We can now apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem, which ensures that dmax is the
greatest fixed point of Φ. Furthermore, by Corollary 2 we know that dmax is indeed
a bisimulation pseudometric, and that it is the greatest bisimulation pseudometric. In
addition, the finite branching property of IIHSs ensures that the closure ordinal of Φ
is ω (cf. Lemma 3.10 in the full version of [9], available on the authors’ web pages).
Therefore one can proceed in a standard way to show that dmax = {Φi(>) | i ∈ N},
where> is the greatest pseudometric (i.e.>(s, s′) = 0 for every s, s′), and Φ0(>) = >.
Given two IIHSs I and I′, with initial states s and s′ respectively, we define the dis-
tance between I and I′ as d(I, I′) = dmax (s, s′). The following properties are auxiliary
to the theorem which states the continuity of the capacity.
Lemma 6. Consider two IIHSs I and I′ with transition functions ϑ and ϑ′ respec-
tively. Given t ≥ 2 and two sequences αt and βt, assume that both I(αt−1, βt−1)
and I′(αt−1, βt−1) are defined, that dmax (I(αt−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1)) < p(βt |
αt, βt−1), and ϑ(I(αt, βt−1)) 6= ∅. Then:
1. ϑ′(I′(αt, βt−1)) 6= ∅ holds as well,
2. I(αt, βt) and I′(αt, βt) are both defined, p(βt | αt, βt−1) > 0, and
dmax (I(α
t, βt), I′(αt, βt)) ≤ dmax (I(α
t−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1))
p(βt | αt, βt−1).
Proof.
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1. Assume ϑ(I(αt, βt−1)) 6= ∅ and, by contradiction, ϑ′(I′(αt, βt−1)) = ∅. Since
dmax is a fixed point of F , we have dmax = F (dmax ), and therefore
dmax (I(α
t, βt−1), I′(αt, βt−1)) = F (dmax )(I(αt, βt−1), I′(αt, βt−1))
= 1
≥ p(βt | αt, βt−1),
against the hypothesis.
2. If ϑ(I(αt, βt−1)) 6= ∅, then, by the first point of this lemma, ϑ′(I′(αt, βt−1)) 6= ∅
holds as well, and therefore both I(αt, βt) and I′(αt, βt) are defined. The hy-
pothesis dmax (I(αt−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1)) < p(βt | αt, βt−1) ensures that
p(βt | αt, βt−1) < 0. Let us now prove the bound on dmax (I(αt, βt), I′(αt, βt)).
By definition of Φ, we have
Φ(dmax )(I(α
t−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1)) ≥ dmax (I(αt, βt−1), I′(αt, βt−1)).
Since dmax = Φ(dmax ), we have
dmax (I(α
t−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1)) ≥ dmax (I(αt, βt−1), I′(αt, βt−1)). (12)
By definition of Φ and of the Kantorovich metric, we have
Φ(dmax )(I(α
t, βt−1), I′(αt, βt−1)) ≥ p(βt | αt, βt−1)·
dmax (I(α
t, βt), I′(αt, βt)).
Using again dmax = Φ(dmax ), we get
dmax (I(α
t, βt−1), I′(αt, βt−1)) ≥ p(βt | αt, βt−1)·
dmax (I(α
t, βt), I′(αt, βt)),
which, together with (12), allows us to conclude.
Lemma 7. Consider two IIHSs I and I′, and let p(· | ·, ·) and p′(· | ·, ·) be their
distributions on the output nodes. Given T > 0, and two sequences αT and βT , assume
that p(βt | αt, βt−1) > 0 for every t < T . Let m = min1≤t<T p(βt | αt, βt−1) and let
 ∈ (0,mT−1). Assume d(I, I′) < . Then, for every t ≤ T , we have
p(βt | αt, βt−1)− p′(βt | αt, βt−1) < 
mT−1
.
Proof. Observe that, for every t < T , I(αt, βt) must be defined, and, by repeatedly
applying Lemma 6(1), we get that also I′(αt, βt) is defined. By definition of ϕ, and of
the Kantorovich metric, we have
p(βt | αt, βt−1)− p′(βt | αt, βt−1) ≤ Φ(dmax )(I(αt−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1)),
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and since dmax is a fixed point of Φ, we get
p(βt | αt, βt−1)− p′(βt | αt, βt−1) ≤ dmax (I(αt−1, βt−1), I′(αt−1, βt−1)). (13)
By applying t− 1 times Lemma 6(2), from (13) we get
p(βt | αt, βt−1)− p′(βt | αt, βt−1) ≤ dmax (I(α
0,β0),I′(α0,β0))
mt−1
= d(I,I
′)
mt−1
≤ d(I,I′)
mT−1
< 
mT−1
Note that previous lemma states a sort of continuity property of the matrices ob-
tained from IIHSs, but not uniform continuity, because of the dependence on one of the
two IIHSs. It is easy to see (from the proof of the Lemma) that uniform continuity does
not hold.
The main contribution of this section, stated in next theorem, is the continuity of the
capacity w.r.t. the pseudometric on IIHSs. For this theorem, we assume that the IIHSs
are normalized. Furthermore, it is crucial that they are secret-nondeterministic (while
the definition of the pseudometric holds in general).
Theorem 4. Consider two normalized IIHSs I and I′, and fix a T > 0. For every  > 0
there exists ν > 0 such that if d(I, I′) < ν then |CT (I)− CT (I′)| < .
Proof. Consider two normalized IIHSs I and I′ and choose T,  > 0. Observe that
|CT (I)− CT (I′)| = |max
pF (·)
1
T
I(AT → BT )−max
pF (·)
1
T
I(A′T → B′T )|
≤ 1T maxpF (·) |I(A
T → BT )− I(A′T → B′T )|
Since the directed information I(AT → BT ) is defined by means of arithmetic opera-
tions and logarithms on the joint probabilities p(αt, βt) and on the conditional probabil-
ities p(αt, βt), p(αt, βt−1), which in turn can be obtained by means of arithmetic oper-
ations from the probabilities p(βt | αt, βt−1) and pF (ϕt), we have that I(AT → BT )
is a continuous functions of the distributions p(βt | αt, βt−1) and pF (ϕt), for ev-
ery t ≤ T . Let p(βt | αt, βt−1), p′(βt | αt, βt−1) be the distributions on the out-
put nodes of I and I′, modified in the following way: starting from level T , whenever
p(βt | αt, βt−1) = 0, then we redefine the distributions at all the output nodes of the
subtree rooted in I(αt, βt) so that they coincide with the distribution of the correspond-
ing nodes of in I′, and analogously for p′(βt | αt, βt−1). Note that this transformation
does not change the directed information, because the subtree rooted in I(αt, βt) does
not contribute to it, due to the fact that it depends the probability of reaching any of its
nodes is 0. The continuity of I(AT → BT ) implies that there exists ′ > 0 such that, if
|p(βt | αt, βt−1)− p′(βt | αt, βt−1)| < ′ for all t ≤ T and all sequences αt, βt, then,
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for any pF (ϕt), we have |I(AT → BT )− I(A′T → B′T )| < . The result then follows
from Lemma 7, by choosing
ν = ′ ·min( min
1 ≤ t < T
p(βt | αt, βt−1) > 0
p(βt | αt, βt−1), min
1 ≤ t < T
p′(βt | αt, βt−1) > 0
p′(βt | αt, βt−1)).
We conclude this section with an example showing that the continuity result for the
capacity does not hold if the construction of the channel is done starting from a system
in which the secrets are endowed with a probability distribution. This is also the reason
why we could not simply adopt the proof technique of the continuity result in [9] and
we had to come up with a different reasoning.
Example 6. Consider the two following programs, where a1, a2 are secrets, b1, b2 are
observable, ‖ is the parallel operator, and +p is a binary probabilistic choice that assigns
probability p to the left branch, and probability 1− p to the right one.
s) (send(a1) +p send(a2)) ‖ receive(x).output(b2)
t) (send(a1) +q send(a2)) ‖ receive(x).if x = a1 then output(b1) else output(b2).
Table 8 shows the fully probabilistic IIHSs corresponding to these programs, and
their associated channels, which in this case (since the secret actions are all at the top-
level) are classical channels, i.e. memoryless and without feedback. As usual for classic
channels, they do not depend on p and q. It is easy to see that the capacity of the
first channel is 0 and the capacity of the second one is 1. Hence their difference is 1,
independently from p and q.
Let now p = 0 and q = . It is easy to see that the distance between s and t is .
Therefore (when the automata have probabilities on the secrets), the capacity is not a
continuous function of the distance.
s t
p 1−p
0 1 0 1
a1 a2
b1 b2 b1 b2
q 1−q
1 0 0 1
a1 a2
b1 b2 b1 b2
(a)
s b1 b2
a1 0 1
a2 0 1
(b)
t b1 b2
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
Table 8. The IIHSs of Example 6 and their corresponding channels, (a) for s and (b) for t.
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8 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have investigated the problem of information leakage in interactive
systems, and proved that these systems can be modeled as channels with memory
and feedback. The situation is summarized in Table 9(a). The comparison with the
classical situation of non-interactive systems is represented in (b). Furthermore, we
have proved that the channel capacity is a continuous function of a pseudometric based
on the Kantorovich metric.
IIHSs as automata IIHSs as channels Notion of leakage
Normalized IIHSs with nondeterministic Sequence of stochastic kernels Leakage as capacity
secrets and probabilistic observables {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1
Normalized IIHSs with a deterministic Sequence of stochastic kernels
scheduler solving the nondeterminism {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 +
reaction function seq. ϕT
Fully probabilistic normalized IIHSs Sequence of stochastic kernels Leakage as directed
{p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 + information I(AT → BT )
reactor {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1
(a)
Classical channels Channels with memory and feedback
The system is modeled in independent uses of The system is modeled in several
the channel, often a unique use. consecutive uses of the channel.
The channel is from AT → BT , i.e., its input The channel is from F → B, i.e. its
is a single string αT = α1 . . . αT of secret input is a reaction function ϕt and its
symbols and its output is a single string βT = output is an observable βt.
β1 . . . βT of observable symbols.
The channel is memoryless and in general The channel has memory. Despite the fact that the
implicitly it is assumed the absence of channel from F → B does not have
feedback. feedback, the internal stochastic kernels
do.
The capacity is calculated using information The capacity is calculated using mutual
I(AT ;BT ). directed information I(AT → BT ).
(b)
Table 9.
Thoroughout the paper we have assumed that the probability distributions on the
secret choices are part of the external knowledge and, therefore, not considered leak-
age. the reader may wonder what could happen if this assumption were dropped. First
of all, we observe that it could make sense, i.e. in certain cases we could argue that the
probabilistic knowledge associated to the secret choices (and its dependence on the ob-
servables) could be considered as part of the leakage. In the cases a and b of the cocaine
auction example in Section 6, for instance, one may want to consider the information
that we can deduce about the secrets (the identities of the bidder) from the observables
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(the increments of the seller) as a leak due to the protocol. Our framework can encom-
pass also this case, and the model remains the same. Nevertheless, the leakage would
be represented by the mutual information rather than by the directed one.
In some other cases the flow of information from the observables to the secrets may
even be considered as a consequence of the active attacks of an adversary, which uses
the observables to modify the probability of the secrets. In this case the leakage would
be divided in two parts: the one due to the protocol, represented by I(AT → BT ), and
the one due to the attacks of the adversaries, and represented by I(BT → AT ). The
total leakage would still be represented by the mutual information.
9 Future work
We would like to provide algorithms to compute the leakage and maximum leakage
of interactive systems. These are rather challenging problems given the exponential
growth of reaction functions (needed to compute the leakage) and the quantification
over infinitely many reactors (given by the definition of maximum leakage in terms
of capacity). One possible solution is to study the relation between deterministic sched-
ulers and sequence of reaction functions. In particular, we believe that for each sequence
of reaction functions and distribution over it there exists a probabilistic scheduler for the
automata representation of the secret-nondeterministic IIHS. In this way, the problem of
computing the leakage and maximum leakage would reduce to a standard probabilistic
model checking problem (where the challenge is to compute probabilities ranging over
infinitely many schedulers).
In addition, we plan to investigate measures of leakage for interactive systems other
than mutual information and capacity.
We intend to study the applicability of our framework to the area of game theory.
In particular, the interactive nature of games such as Prisoner Dilemma [21] and Stag
and Hunt [23] (in their iterative versions) can be modeled as channels with memory and
feedback following the techniques proposed in this work. Furthermore, (probabilistic)
strategies can be encoded as reaction functions. In this way, optimal strategies are at-
tained by reaction functions maximizing the leakage of the channel.
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Appendix
A: An example illustrating the the encoder/decoder design
In this section we consider again the erasure channel of Example 2 to show how the
enriched model of channels with memory and feedback can be used to transmit the
message, and in particular how the feedback can be used to design the encoder. We
assume that the setW of possible messages consists of all finite sequences of bits. The
role of the code functions is to encode the message W into a suitable representation for
the stochastic kernels within the channel. The input alphabet for the stochastic kernels is
A = {0, 1} and the output alphabet is B = {0, 1,e}, where the special output symbol e
signals that a bit was erased. We assume that at most T uses of the channel are allowed
and we use t, with 1 ≤ t ≤ T , to represent the tth time step.
We consider a sort of memory that depends only on the input history and we abstract
from its specific form by defining a function µ : ℘f (At) 7→ [0, 1] that maps each
possible input history to a correction factor to be added to (or subtracted from) a base
probability value. We compute the contribution of µ to the base values using arithmetics
modulo 2, in such a way that the resulting values are still a probability distribution. More
precisely, the stochastic kernels are defined as follows.
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p(βt = 0|αt−10, βt−1) = 0.8− µ(αt−1)
p(βt = 1|αt−10, βt−1) = 0
p(βt = e|αt−10, βt−1) = 0.2 + µ(αt−1)
p(βt = 0|αt−11, βt−1) = 0
p(βt = 1|αt−11, βt−1) = 0.8− µ(αt−1)
p(βt = e|αt−11, βt−1) = 0.2 + µ(αt−1)
(14)
Correspondingly, the general form of the channel matrix for each time 1 ≤ t ≤ T
is shown in Table 10.
0 1 e
αt = 0, β
t−1 0.8− µ(αt−1) 0 0.2 + µ(αt−1)
αt = 1, β
t−1 0 0.8− µ(αt−1) 0.2 + µ(αt−1)
Table 10. General form of channel matrix for 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
The code functions are chosen at time t = 0 based on the message to be transmitted.
For illustration purposes, let us suppose that the message is the sequence of three bits
W = 011. The other cases of W are analogous.
At time t = 1, the channel is used for its first time and the feedback history so far is
empty β0 = . The encoder selects the input symbol α0 = 0, as in (15).
f1[W = 011](β
0 = ) = 0 (15)
At time t = 2, the feedback history consists of only one symbol, and in principle
the possibilities are either β1 = 0, β1 = 1 or β1 = e. In the first case, the first
bit was successfully transmitted and the encoder can go on to the second bit of the
message. By the way the channel is defined, the second case is not really possible, so it
is not important how the reaction function is defined for this case. We will denote this
indifference by attributing to the function the symbol x instead of a 0 or a 1. In the last
case, β1 = e, the first bit was erased and the encoder tries to retransmit the bit 0. We
can write it formally as below.
f2[W = 011](β
1 = 0) = 1
f2[W = 011](β
1 = 1) = x
f2[W = 011](β
1 = e) = 0
(16)
At time t = 3 the feedback histories allowed by the channel are β2 ∈ {01, 0e,e0,ee}
(the other ones have zero probability). In the first case, β2 = 01 the two first bits of
the message have been transmitted correctly and the encoder can send the third bit. If
β2 = 0e, the transmission of the first bit was successful, but the second bit was erased
and needs to be resent. In the case β2 = e0, the first bit was erased in the first try
but was successfully transmitted in the second try, so now the encoder can move to the
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second bit of the message. In the last case, β2 = ee, the two tries were unsuccessful
and the encoder still needs to transmit the first bit of the message. Formally:
f3[W = 011](β
2 = 00) = x
f3[W = 011](β
2 = 01) = 0
f3[W = 011](β
2 = 0e) = 1
f3[W = 011](β
2 = 10) = x
f3[W = 011](β
2 = 11) = x
f3[W = 011](β
2 = 1e) = x
f3[W = 011](β
2 = e0) = 1
f3[W = 011](β
2 = e1) = x
f3[W = 011](β
2 = ee) = 0
(17)
We can easily extend the construction of code functions ft for 3 ≤ t ≤ T using this
encoding scheme.
The decoder is very simple: once all time steps 1, . . . , T have taken place, it just
takes the output whole trace βT and removes the occurrences of the erased bit symbol
e in order to recover the original message.
Table 11 shows a concrete example of a possible behavior of binary erasure channel
with memory and feedback in a scenario where the message is W = 011 and the chan-
nel can be used T = 3 times. Note that in this particular example the maximum uses of
the channel is achieved before the whole message is successfully sent: the decoder can
recover only the two first bits of the original message.
B: Normalization of IIHS trees
In this section we will address the problem of normalizing an IIHS in such a way it is
compatible with the assumptions made along the paper. The process of normalization
described bellow is general enough to be applied to any IIHS without loss of generality
or expressive power.
Consider a general IIHS I = (M,A,B) with M = (Q,L, sˆ, ϑ), where L = A∪B.
Assume that we are interested only in executions that involve up to T interactions, i.e
T uses of the system, with one secret taking place and one observable produced at each
time.
In the normalization process, we unfold the automaton up to level 2T , since there is
one secret symbol and one observable symbol for each step. We also extend the secret
alphabet A with a new symbol a∗ /∈ A and the observable alphabet B with a new
symbol b∗ /∈ B. These new symbols will be used as placeholders when we need to
re-balance the tree. Let A′ = A ∪ {a∗} and B′ = B ∪ {b∗}.
For a given level t let Labels(I, t) be the set of all labels of transitions that can be
performed with a non-zero probability from the states at the tth level of the automaton.
Formally:
Labels(I, t) ≡ {` ∈ L | ∃σ, s . |σ| = t, last(σ) `→ s}
The normalization of the IIHS I leads to an equivalent IIHS I′ = (M ′,A′,B′),
where M ′ = (Q′,L′, sˆ′, ϑ′) and L′ = A′ ∪ B′; and such that, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ 2T :
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Time Code functions Feedback Encoder Channel Decoder
t ft(β
t−1) history βt−1 αt = ft[W ](βt−1) p(βt|αt, βt−1) Wˆ = γ(βT )
t = 0 Code functions for ———- ———- ———- ———-
W = 011 are selected.
t = 1 As in (15)  α1 = f1[W = 011]() According to ———-
= 0 p(β1|0, )
produces β1 = e
t = 2 As in s (16) e α2 = f2[W = 011](e) According to ———-
= 0 p(β2|00,e)
produces β2 = 0
t = 3 As in s (17) e0 α3 = f3[W = 011](e0) According to ———-
= 1 p(β3|001,e0)
produces β3 = 1
t = 4 ———- ———- ———- ———- Decoded message
Wˆ = γ(β3 = e01)
= 01
Table 11. A possible evolution of the binary channel with time, for W = 011 and T = 3
1. Labels(I′, t) ⊆ A′ or Labels(I′, t) ⊆ B′;
2. Labels(I′, t) ⊆ A′ iff Labels(I′, t+ 1) ⊆ B′, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1;
3. Labels(I′, 1) ⊆ A′;
Condition 1 states that each level consists of either the secret actions only, or the
observable actions only. Condition 2 states that secret and observable levels alternate.
Condition 3 says that the automaton starts with a secret level.
The proof is straightforward. First, the new symbols a∗ and b∗ are placeholders for
the absence of a secret and observable symbol, respectively. If in a given level twe want
to have only secret symbols, we can postpone the occurrences of observable symbols at
this level as follows: add a∗ to the secret level and “move” all the observable symbols
to the subtree of a∗. Figure 8 exemplifies the local transformations we need to make on
the tree.
Note that in 8(b) the introduction of new nodes changed the probabilities of the
transitions in the tree. In general, to normalize a secret level we need to introduce a∗ in
order to postpone the observable symbols, and the probabilities change as follows:
1. For every ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the associated is probability is mantained as p′ai = pai ;
2. The probability of the new symbol a∗ is introduced as pa∗ =
∑m
i=0 pbi ;
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· · · · · ·
a1 an b1
bm
pa1 pan pb1
pbm
(a) Local nodes of the tree before the trans-
formation
· · ·
· · ·
a1 an
a∗
b1 bm
p′a1 p′an
pa∗
p′b1 p
′
bm
(b) Local nodes of the tree after the
transformation
Fig. 8. Local transformation on an IIHS tree
3. If pa∗ 6= 0, then for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the associated probability of bj is updated to
p′bj = pbj/pa∗ = pbj/
∑m
k=0 pbk . If pa∗ = 0, then p
′
bj
= 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
pb∗ = 1.
The subtrees of each node of the original tree are preserved as they are, until we
apply the same transformation to them. If a node does not have a sutree (i.e, no descen-
dants), we create a subtree by adding all the possible actions in B with probability 0,
and the action b∗ with probability 1.
If we are normalizing an observable level, the same rules apply, guarding the proper
symmetry between secrets and observables. We then proceed on the same way on the
deeper levels of the tree. Figure 9 shows an example of a full transformation on a tree
(for the sake of readability, we omit the levels where only a∗ = 1 or b∗ = 1).
a1 b1
a11 b12 a11 b12
0.2 0.8
0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6
(a) Tree before transformation
a1 a11
a∗
b1 b12
b∗ b1 b12
b∗
a1 a11
a∗ a1 a11
a∗ a1 a11
a∗
b1 b12
b∗ b1 b12
b∗ b1 b12
b∗ b1 b12
b∗
0.2
0
0.8
0.7
0
0 1
0
0
0
0
1 0
1
0 0
0.4
0.8
0
0
1 0
0
1 0
0
1 0
1
0
(b) Tree after transformation
Fig. 9. Transformation on an IIHS tree
C: Extended Cocaine Auction Protocol Example
We shall now extend the example of our approach applied to a real system. In Section 6
we introduced the Cocaine Auction Protocol and showed how to formalize one instance
of it as an IIHS (Figure 7). We have also already defined the stochastic kernels for this
example.
The next step is to construct all the possible reaction functions {ϕt(βt−1)}Tt=1. As
seen in Section 4.2, the reaction functions are the correspondent to the encoder in the
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channel. They take the feedback story and decide how the world is going to react to this
situation. Table 12 contains the reaction functions for each time t ≤ 2.
(a) All 3 reaction functions ϕ1
β0 f1(1) f1(2) f1(3)
∅ Candlemaker Scarface a∗
(b) All 27 reaction functions ϕ2(β1)
β1 f2(1)(β
1) f2(2)(β
1) f2(3)(β
1) f2(4)(β
1) f2(5)(β
1) f2(6)(β
1) f2(7)(β
1)
inc1 Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker
inc2 Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker Scarface Scarface Scarface a∗
b∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗ Candlemaker
β1 f2(8)(β
1) f2(9)(β
1) f2(10)(β
1) f2(11)(β
1) f2(12)(β
1) f2(13)(β
1) f2(14)(β
1)
inc1 Candlemaker Candlemaker Scarface Scarface Scarface Scarface Scarface
inc2 a∗ a∗ Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker Scarface Scarface
b∗ Scarface a∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗ Candlemaker Scarface
β1 f2(15)(β
1) f2(16)(β
1) f2(17)(β
1) f2(18)(β
1) f2(19)(β
1) f2(20)(β
1) f2(21)(β
1)
inc1 Scarface Scarface Scarface Scarface a∗ a∗ a∗
inc2 Scarface a∗ a∗ a∗ Candlemaker Candlemaker Candlemaker
b∗ a∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗
β1 f2(22)(β
1) f2(23)(β
1) f2(24)(β
1) f2(25)(β
1) f2(26)(β
1) f2(27)(β
1) -
inc1 a∗ a∗ a∗ a∗ a∗ a∗ -
inc2 Scarface Scarface Scarface a∗ a∗ a∗ -
b∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗ Candlemaker Scarface a∗ -
Table 12. Reaction functions for the cocaine auction example.
Now we need to define the reactor, i.e., the probability distribution on reaction func-
tions. Corollary 1 shows that we can do so by using the following equations:
p(ϕ1) = p(α1|α0, β0) = p(α1)
p(ϕt|ϕt−1) =
∏
βt−1
p(ϕt(β
t−1)|ϕt−1(βt−2), βt−1), 2 ≤ t ≤ T
For instance, p(f1(1)) = p(Candlemaker) = p1. In the same way, p(f1(2)) =
p(Scarface) = p2 and p(f1(3)) = p(a∗) = p3.
Let us take as an example the calculation of p(f2(6)|f1(3)):
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p(f2(6)|f1(1)) =
∏
β1
p(f2(6)(β
1)|ϕ1(1), β1)
= p(f2(6)(inc1)|Candlemaker, inc1) · p(f2(6)(inc2)|Candlemaker, inc2)
p(f2(6)(b∗)|Candlemaker, b∗)
= p(Candlemaker|Candlemaker, inc1) · p(Scarface|Candlemaker, inc2)
p(a∗|Candlemaker, b∗)
= p9 · p13 · 1
= p9p13 (18)
Note that some reaction functions can have probability 0, which is consistent with
the probabilistic automaton. For instance:
p(f2(25)|f1(3)) =
∏
β1
p(f2(25)(β
1)|ϕ1(3), β1)
= p(f2(25)(inc1)|a∗, inc1) · p(f2(25)(inc2)|a∗, inc2) · p(f2(25)(b∗)|a∗, b∗)
= p(a∗|a∗, inc1) · p(a∗|a∗, inc2) · p(Candlemaker|a∗, b∗)
= 1 · 1 · 0
= 0 (19)
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